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Offshore Drilling Blowout Risk Model – A Comprehensive Integration 
of Basic Causes, Safety Barriers, Risk Influencing Factors and 
Operational Performance Indicators 
Offshore drilling is an activity inherent to the oil and gas industry as it is essential 
for confirming the economic feasibility of hydrocarbon reservoirs. However, 
operational uncertainties and risks inherent to typical major accident hazards are 
associated with the performance of this activity, where blowouts are assumed to be 
one of the major contributors to risk in offshore drilling. 
This paper presents an accident precursor risk model for offshore drilling blowouts 
that integrates the blowout basic causes, safety critical barriers & elements, Risk 
Influencing Factors (RIF) including Human and Organizational Factors (HOF), 
and Operational Performance Indicators (OPI). The method, which was adopted to 
design the model and allow its customization for reflecting the characteristics of 
any drilling rig, well and operation is also described and demonstrated using a 
theoretical example. The model is hybrid, as it combines bow-tie diagram (fault 
tree and event tree) with directed acyclic graphs (DAG), to account for the effect 
of the RIF on the performance of safety barriers through the direct observation of 
pre-defined OPI. 
Keywords: Quantitative risk analysis (QRA), Blowout, Risk Influencing Factor 
(RIF) and Operational Performance Indicators (OPI). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
The risks inherent to drilling projects must be assessed prior to and during 
operations. Risk assessment studies are part of the regulatory framework of many 
countries and are critical documents for the permit process of drilling activities. For 
instance, the UK (Health and Safety Executive, 2006), states that the primary objectives 
of risk assessment in this context are to identify and rank risks so that they can be 
adequately managed, and to examine associated risk reduction measures to determine 
those most suitable for implementation.  
However, blowout risk models frequently do not properly address the 
characteristics of the project that can affect blowout risk. A review of several blowout 
risk assessment studies performed by the authors reinforced what was already shown by 
(Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012), which is that most of these studies are similar and generic. 
Most risk models do not address the characteristics inherent to the basic causes of the 
kick, which is the major blowout accident precursor. In addition, quantification is limited 
to reviews of accident frequency databases that, in most cases, are not adjusted to the 
characteristics of the system and operations. As a consequence, specific risk influencing 
factors (RIF) of geology, equipment, systems and human and organizational factors 
(HOF) are not considered in the risk model, as those have already been discussed and 
demonstrated by other authors (Vinnem, 2007); (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012); 
(Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2011). 
The aim of this research paper is to propose an accident precursor blowout risk 
model, designed so that it can be easily expended and customized to reflect the 
characteristics of the well, drilling rig and operations. It must also account for and 
integrate basic causes, safety critical barrier elements & systems, RIF, and Operational 
Performance Indicators (OPI).  
This research paper is divided into three major parts: 
 Section 2 - This section is focus on safety and reliability professionals who are 
not familiar to drilling  and so, presents a general background on drilling 
engineering and the causes of blowouts, including a description of the safety 
critical barriers and Operational Performance Indicators (OPI) for detecting a 
kick, the blowout accident precursor.  
 Section 3 – Describes the methodology adopted to design the proposed model and 
provides further guidelines to customize it for a specific project.  
 Section 4 - Presents the results of the application of the methodology by: i) 
suggesting a comprehensive blowout risk model (Section 4.1), and; ii) providing 
an example of further customization for reflecting the specific conditions of a 
drilling project (Section 4.2). 
2 BACKGROUND IN DRILLING ENGINEERING AND BLOWOUT 
2.1 Basic concepts on drilling engineering 
The drilling of a wildcat or exploratory well is still the only way of confirming 
the existence of a hydrocarbon reservoir, and a success rate of only one in four wells gives 
some indication of the difficulties encountered in determining the existence of 
hydrocarbon deposits (Thomas, 2001). When hydrocarbons are encountered, a well test 
is conducted to evaluate the reservoir’s potential to produce hydrocarbons. 
A drilling project is characterized by different stages in preparation for well 
construction. The first stage is the design phase, which depends on the results of an overall 
assessment of the area to be drilled. This phase of the project requires geological studies 
and a review of historical data gathered from wells previously drilled in the area. 
The data gathering process is critical to the success and safety of the drilling 
operations from the beginning of the project. Geological and geophysical (G&G) 
uncertainties can be reduced when more information is available, minimizing the 
project’s risks. This stage may also include geotechnical investigations to identify 
possible geological hazards (geohazards). Geohazards include risks related to 
irregularities in subsea topography, that are critical to determining the exact well head 
location – with the subsurface target in mind – which consequently impacts the following 
stages of the project. Another example of a geohazard is the presence of shallow gas in 
the area (Thomas, 2001). These types of hazards are not covered in this research paper, 
which focuses on deep blowouts. 
During the design phase, certain risk-averse assumptions are usually made, 
resulting in well designs catering for worst-case conditions. This approach is preferred by 
oil companies due to the uncertainties involved in all the steps of the design as well as the 
fact that most wells have historically been designed in a deterministic manner (Dahlin, 
Snaas, & Norton, 1998). Uncertainty is higher in deep-water wells, especially if they are 
exploratory. All uncertainties regarding pore pressure (pp), fracture (pf) and temperature 
gradients add up (∆T), and the design factors on casing design need to be higher to 
account for these uncertainties. 
Once the Geology and Geophysical (G&G) department estimates the lithology 
and selects the ‘target’, defined as the precise place in the reservoir that must be 
intercepted by the well, a critical phase of the well design begins: the estimation of geo-
pressures. The geo-pressure study consists of calculating the existing underground 
stresses and which of them affect the formations. This study calculates the following data 
as a function of depth (D), using empirical models: over burden pressure (pob), pore 
pressure (pp), collapse pressure (pc), and fracture pressure (pf) (See Figure 1). As well as 
being essential for proceeding with the design of the well, geo-pressure estimation 
indicates the gradient window (or operational window) for drilling operations. The 
gradient window defines the lower (𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛) and upper limit (𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥) of the drilling fluid 
density (called mud weight (Wm) ), equivalent to the hydrostatic pressure (ph) applied to 
the borehole to maintain its integrity (primary well control) (Rocha & Azevedo, 2009; 
Thomas, 2001). For exploratory wells categorized as wildcats, in areas where offset wells 
are not available, seismic images may be used to assess structural and stratigraphic traps, 
and to estimate gradients, enabling a preliminary geohazard analysis and constituting an 
important risk mitigation measure. 
 
Figure 1: Example of operational window modified from (International Association of 
Drilling Contractors, 2015). 
These sets of information are the main components of the geological prognosis 
and the basis of the design - the starting point for a detailed drilling program. The detailed 
drilling program consists in combining well trajectory with pressure gradients, mud 
weights and the casing program. The well trajectory is determined based on subsea 
geological characteristics, the formation lithology and in-situ stresses, the depth, azimuth 
and horizontal displacement of the potential production zone, the type of technology to 
be used in the Bottom Hole Assembly (BHA) and the type of drilling unit that is likely to 
be utilized.  
As a result of this stage, the operational performance indicators (OPI) related to 
G&G risk factors may be identified. These are the main operational parameters that are 
monitored and controlled during well construction.  An indicator is a variable (x) that can 
measure a change in the condition of a broader phenomenon or situation. For the purposes 
of this paper, an operational performance indicator (OPI) is defined as an indicator used 
during operational time, capable of quantifying the condition or the status of the entire 
drilling operation, measuring the effect or influence of these changes in the risk of a major 
event. An “event“ (E) in this paper is identified as any deviation from the normal 
operation status or safety condition (Resvold Tranverg, 2013; Tamim, Laboureur, 
Mentzer, Hasan, & Mannan, 2017). The safety condition h is a function of the variable 
(operational parameters) and the constraints (a,b) that the operation needs to satisfy. 
These constraints are mainly identified as minimum and maximum values for operational 
parameters (Tamim et al., 2017). 
 ℎ(𝑥) = {𝑥: 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏} (Equation 1) 
The use of safety performance indicators to evaluate the operational trend and 
monitor the level of risk comes from the nuclear industry. There are two kinds of 
performance indicators: leading indicators and lagging indicators. Leading indicators are 
preventive and proactive, they may be used as safety precursors to identify the barriers 
degradation for management and operators to response. Lagging indicators are 
measurements used to compare performance between similar facilities or to measure the 
complete performance of the plant as a benchmarking assessment (Hopkins, 2011). Both 
kinds of indicators are very useful; however, the former are more operational and could 
help to identify the safety level of the process and prevent major accidents.  
The operational performance indicators (OPI) are dynamic and considered to be 
leading indicators, implying they are preventive, and may be modified as the process goes 
forward. For example,  the percentage of personnel with High Pressure High Temperature 
(HPHT) training, the percentage of people with z levels of experience, and the percentage 
of people with y level of awareness.   
However, lagging indicators are indicators that are useful to provide the picture 
of the installation at a specific moment (operational time), but are not expected to change 
during the overall operation (Øien, Utne, & Herrera, 2011; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). 
Examples would include: near misses, process incidents (kick for instance), breakdown 
of safety critical equipment and leakages.  
The relationship between operational performance indicators (OPI) and risk 
influencing factors is established by the relationship between the awareness indicators 
(e.g. kick detection, based on the identification of kick tolerance and effective killing 
procedures). For example, the RIF related to training and competence could be identified 
by 3 main indicators: personnel experience, training and awareness. The three lagging 
indicators of the RIF could have an impact on the detection of low pressures, correct mud 
preparation, detection of integrity barrier failure, and management of changes in design. 
The well design process might change slightly, as all these variables are assumed to be 
interdependent, making the workflow an iterative process as opposite to a single linear 
process. 
The next stage of a drilling project is the well construction, the beginning of which 
is known in the industry as “spud-in". This stage consists of four main activities: drilling, 
tripping, casing and cementing. Drilling and tripping operations can be described as 
geological layers being drilled through by a rotating drill bit, connected to a drill string (a 
string made up of Drill Pipe joints, working in tension and transmitting torque to the bit), 
which applies part of its weight to the formation. The drilling fluid (or mud) is pumped 
at pressure through the string with the purpose of overcoming pressure losses, achieving 
minimum annular velocity that ensures hole cleaning (cutting transportation to surface) 
and balancing formation pressure in specific operational conditions: 
- Static conditions: pumps off; 
- Swab effect: small clearance between BHA and borehole walls jointly with 
fluid viscosity lead to a negative pressure when pulling the string, reducing 
the amount of overbalance and potentially causing a kick; 
- Surge effects: opposite of swab, leading to excessive overbalance hence fluid 
losses or fracturing; 
- Impact of cutting loading (suspended cuttings of high specific gravity) on 
Equivalent Mud Weight increase (EMW); 
- Trip margin: amount of additional MW required as a safety margin prior to 
POOH string (in case of a kick, well control is much more difficult without 
string in the hole, due to the impossibility to circulate); 
- Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD): The effective density exerted by a 
circulating fluid against the formation that takes into account the pressure drop 
in the annulus above the point being considered. 
The mud is critical for maintaining well integrity through hydrostatic pressure 
(ph). The casing and cementing phase starts with the installation of a large 
diameter steel pipe known as a conductor. Typically, a 30 to 36-inch diameter 
pipe (conductor) is installed, with the aim of preventing hole collapse and 
providing a conduit for circulation (fluid return) for the subsequent hole section, 
avoiding severe wash outs (mud circulation causing unwanted hole enlargement 
due to excessive flow rate and/or unconsolidated formation) or losses. Oil and gas 
wells are drilled in different sections, with decreasing diameters as depth 
increases. As detailed by Thomas (2001), the number of phases depends on the 
geological characteristics of the formation and the total depth of the well. After 
having been drilled, each phase is completed with the installation and cementation 
of a casing string. Casing strings have different functions according to the section 
they cover, including: preventing borehole collapse, avoiding contamination of 
underground fresh water layers close to the surface, avoiding migration of fluids 
from the formation, and sustaining the well head and well control equipment.  
The management of well integrity during well operations involves the placement, 
maintenance and testing of adequate barriers throughout the process, preventing the 
escalation of a well control event (International Association of Drilling Contractors, 
2015).  Table 1 presents the relationship between the operational barriers and the 
previously mentioned four drilling phases of well construction. 
Table 1: Physical barriers and their relevance during drilling phases. 
 
2.2 Immediate causes of blowout and well control barriers 
A blowout is an uncontrolled influx of hydrocarbon released into the environment 
(atmosphere or underwater) as the ultimate consequence of a kick. A kick is an 
unexpected flow of formation fluids into the wellbore that occurs when the following 
conditions are met simultaneously: 
 The hydrostatic pressure inside the wellbore is lower than the pore pressure of the 
permeable formation (underbalance), including not only reservoirs but any other 
fluid bearing formations (𝑝ℎ < 𝑝𝑝); 
 The formation is sufficiently permeable; and  
 The fluid viscosity is low enough to allow it to flow  (𝜌𝑓 < 𝜌𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛). 
 
Physical barrier Drilling Phase 
Drilling Tripping Casing and Cementing 
Drilling fluid x x 
 
Casing 
  
x 
Cement 
  
x 
Casing shoe 
  
x 
Wellhead seals/CHSA 
  
x 
BOP x x 
 
Cement Plug 
  
x 
By meeting the presented geological and geophysical (G&G) conditions, a 
blowout may result from one of the following basic causes (Robert. & Grace, 2003; 
Rosenberg & Nielsen, 1997): 
 Mud weight becomes lower than formation pore pressure (𝑊𝑚 < 𝑝𝑝)  due to a 
failure in filling the hole (in this case we refer to equivalent mud weight) or due 
to mud density not being properly selected or prepared and maintained on-site. 
These issues become complex to foresee and assess in deep water drilling, where 
high temperature and pressure conditions have substantial effects on mud density 
(𝜌𝑓) and rheology (the science and study of the deformation and flow of matter); 
 Failure to keep the hole full while tripping, i.e, when pulling the drill string out of 
the hole; 
 Swabbing while tripping; 
 Insufficient Wait On Cement (WOC) and uncontrolled flow at surface during 
wellhead/BOP work; 
 Abnormal formation pressure; 
 Insufficient mud level in the annulus / lost circulation. 
 
Ensuring the availability and effectiveness of well control barriers is critical when 
drilling into the reservoir. A well barrier is defined by NORSOK (2004) as an 
envelope of one or several dependent barrier elements preventing fluids or gases from 
flowing unintentionally from the formation into another formation or to the surface. 
Well barriers are divided into primary well barriers and secondary well barriers.  
The primary barrier is the hydrostatic column of the fluid that controls formation 
pressure during well construction or workover activities, i.e. maintains the well 
integrity in the drilling phase, whereas the secondary barrier is composed of the 
systems that are responsible for responding to the kick when it occurs, more 
specifically the blowout preventer system (kick detection system is not considered as 
a barrier from the well control standpoint, although it constitutes a system of barriers 
from the risk analysis standpoint).  
Consequently, the following systems are considered as safety critical for preventing the 
risk of blowouts: the mud system; the kick detection system and its indicators, and the 
blowout preventer system. 
2.3 Blowout safety critical systems 
2.3.1 Mud system 
The safety function of the mud system is to maintain the integrity of the primary 
well control barrier, which is the hydrostatic column of fluid that controls formation 
pressure during well construction or workover activities. This system has two major 
failure modes: failure in delivering the adequate mud weight and failure in delivering 
sufficient mud volume to fill up the well when mud loss occurs. 
Insufficient mud weight may result from several factors, most of them directly or 
indirectly related to human and organizational factors (HOF), for instance: 
 A misjudgement of well conditions as a consequence of human error or 
instrumentation failure (penetration rate, cutting shape and size, gas readings, D 
Exponent or Sigma Log); 
 Accidental dilution of the mud by drill water in the active tanks; 
 Mud being cut by gas, water or oil, which impacts the mud density; 
 An erroneous pore pressure estimate, as in the instance of an exploratory well 
hitting the crest of a reservoir with a gas cap; 
 An unexpected non-sealing tectonic fault being penetrated and causing pressure 
communication with deeper and/or overpressure zones. 
Abnormal formation pressure may also cause the failure of the primary well 
control barrier.  Note that in the case of a low permeability formation, the fluid might 
flow at such a low rate that the section might be cased off before the influx becomes a 
threat. Other signs of an underbalance condition are sloughing or heaving shales, and 
excessive hole fill (Blakeston, 2011).   
Circulation losses may be caused by excessive ECD (related to flow rate and mud 
properties) or surge pressures such as sudden string movements or abrupt activation of 
mud pumps without staging up gradually when the bit is near the bottom of the hole. In 
case of severe losses into non-sealing faults, natural or artificial fractures, or depleted 
layers, the mud level in the annulus will decrease. If the hydrostatic column drops below 
the level corresponding to equilibrium with formation pressure, a particularly dangerous 
kick may occur, as the influx will not be detected until it replaces the lost volume. Such 
volume might be well over the design kick tolerance margin. 
2.3.2 Kick Detection System and Kick Indicators 
The function of the kick detection system is to ensure that the kick is detected 
before hydrocarbons reach the blowout preventer (BOP). The warning signs of a kick 
during drilling are nearly equivalent to those in offshore shallow water or land operations, 
and are divided into two categories: positive indicators of kick during drilling and signs 
that the condition of near-balance or underbalance is approaching. Positive indicators of 
a kick during drilling are: 
 A flow rate increase at returns. In a closed system at regime, an increase in returns 
at the flow line is equivalent to a net gain. In a floating vessel, heave and roll may 
mask small increases in flowrate, Managed Pressure Drilling systems circumvent 
this problem by allowing detection of small influxes independent of rig type and 
sea conditions. To summarize, an increase in returns is a definite sign of a kick in 
progress;  
 Pit volume increase. This is similar to a flow rate increase: in a closed system, a 
pit gain is a definite sign of a kick, however this sign will appear a few minutes 
after the flow shoe has seen the kick. At this point the kick volume will be much 
larger and more dangerous, from here there is a need for early kick detection; 
 Pump pressure decrease/pump stroke increase. The formation influx reduces the 
hydrostatic pressure in the annulus, and as the drill pipe hydrostatic is not affected, 
U-tubing will occur and the pump will not need to provide as much energy. 
Signs that the balance or underbalance condition is approaching warns the 
operator that there is a risk of meeting the geological and geophysical (G&G) conditions 
necessary for a kick: porosity, permeability and underbalance condition (which may be 
due to an overpressure regime). The following operational drilling parameters may 
indicate the presence of one or more geological and geophysical (G&G) risk influencing 
factors: 
 Depth. The depth is not an indicator by itself, however the top reservoir / target is 
estimated based on relevant studies and several other factors. The entire well 
design has its foundations on the geological prognosis (target depth and position, 
gradients, formation tops), and an accurate estimate greatly reduces operational 
risks.  
 Oil and/or gas shows. These are spotted visually by the derrick man at the shale 
shakers during lag time, or detected by the gas chromatograph on the mud logging 
unit, and are the clearest indicators of having reached the reservoir. However, 
there may be shows at depths other than the pay zone due to near-balance 
conditions, migration, or minor hydrocarbon bearing layers that are not part of the 
main reservoir(s). Gas shows are differentiated from background gas due to their 
composition (gas chromatograph) and levels (measured in parts per million, ppm). 
Continuously detecting and analysing the gas brought to surface by the mud 
constitutes a large quota of the operational safety and kick prevention during 
drilling. For instance, gas percentage thresholds are set beforehand to operate the 
mud degasser, and to suspend drilling;  
 Drilling breaks. This is an abrupt increase in Rate Of Penetration (ROP) that 
indicates a formation change, likely over-pressured sand (possibly hydrocarbon 
bearing). The higher pore pressure aids the crushing or scraping action of the drill 
bit. Note that the drilling break may also be a kick indicator during drilling; 
however, it is not a positive one. ROP variations are considered in conjunction 
with prognosed lithology, master logs from offset wells, other curves and trends, 
and cutting analysis; 
 Shape and size of cuttings. After lag time, cuttings samples are collected at the 
surface and examined for lithology, fluorescence (hydrocarbon presence), and 
their shape and size give an indication of formation pore pressure and the amount 
of overbalance; 
 Downhole pressure is measured in real time by a Logging While Drilling (LWD) 
tool. Other LWD tools include Gamma Ray, Sonic, Resistivity, and Neutron 
Density, which are available in real time and provide accuracy and resolution 
similar to conventional wireline tools. LWD is often used in deep water drilling 
as its cost is justified by offsetting the rig time required for open hole logging, to 
be able to case long or unstable sections before stability problems arise, for geo-
steering in horizontal wells in thin beds, or simply to increase confidence and 
operational safety during drilling (formation detection, downhole pressure 
measurement and management, and seeking superior performance);  
 The relationship between ROP and hydrostatic differential pressure. D-Exponent 
and sigma-log provide direct measurement of the relationship between ROP and 
hydrostatic differential pressure (which in turn depends on mud weight and pore 
pressure). Maintaining a constant weight on bit (WOB), rotation per minute 
(RPM), and correcting for mud weights, a plot of incremental ROP defines an 
increasing trend in the normally pressured zone. The trend should reverse when 
drilling into an over-pressured zone; 
 Mud salinity. Provided that a water-based mud is used, measuring the chloride 
content in the mud is a valid method for determining underbalance conditions, as 
salt water contained in the formation drilled can enter the well bore and cause an 
increase of chlorides in the mud. A similar concept applies to mud resistivity and 
PH; 
 Mud temperature. Over-pressured shales contain a considerable amount of water, 
which acts as an insulant and prevents heat spreading uniformly from below. Mud 
temperatures are plotted against depth and the interpretation of the curve may lead 
to the detection of the over-pressured zone, which might correspond to the 
reservoir. This method is rarely used since the results are not always reliable. 
Table 2 summarizes the operational performance indicators (OPI) for kick 
detection. 
 
 
Table 2: List of operational performance indicators (OPI) related to G&G risk factors. 
 
Kick 
detection OPI  
Way of detection 
Geological and Geophysical (G&G) risk factors 
HC Porosity Permeability HP/HT Abnormal 
Pressure 
Increase in 
flow rate 
Rig instrumentation X X X  X 
Increase in pit 
volume 
Rig instrumentation or 
visual 
X X X   
Pump pressure 
decrease/pump 
stroke increase 
Rig instrumentation/ 
pressure gauges 
X X X  X 
Depth 
Rig instrumentation 
Mud logging records 
Directional Drilling 
survey 
Driller’s pipe tally 
X   X X 
Oil and gas 
shows 
Visual observation 
Gas chromatograph 
Rig gas detectors 
X X X  X 
Drilling break/ 
increase in rate 
of penetration 
(ROP) 
Visual observation 
Rig instrumentation 
Mud logging 
instrumentation 
Directional driller 
drilling parameters 
sheet 
X X X  X 
Cuttings 
analysis 
Visual observation 
(derrick man, 
Company Man) 
Mud logging service 
X X   X 
Real time 
downhole 
pressure 
(LWD) 
BHA tools at an offset 
distance from bit, 
transmitted in real time 
but requiring QC and 
interpretation 
   X X 
Other LWD 
readings, i.e. 
gamma ray, 
neutron-
density, 
resistivity 
tools  
BHA tools at an offset 
distance from bit, 
transmitted in real time 
but requiring QC and 
interpretation 
X X X X  
Empirical 
relationship 
between depth 
and ROP 
D-Exponent and 
Sigma-log, based on 
OPI’s depth and ROP 
   X X 
Mud salinity 
Mud checks (field mud 
engineer analysis) 
 X X  X 
Mud 
temperature 
Mud logging sensor    X X 
The main OPI for kick detection during drilling (kick indicators) are instantaneous 
parameters such as rate of penetration (ROP), stand pipe pressure (SPP), mud returns at 
the flowline, and active mud pit levels. Redundancy is guaranteed by installing two or 
more independent sensors, typically one sensor connected to the mud logging unit and a 
similar sensor connected to the driller console. In modern deep-water Mobile Offshore 
Drilling Units (MODU), further redundancy is built into the rig by using two active 
sensors connected to the driller’s console for each parameter. A typical example is mud 
pit levels: two sensors measure the same level and the averaged level between the two is 
displayed on the driller console. Should a sensor fail, the driller is alerted and the reading 
of the remaining sensor is displayed. 
Static or dynamic flow checks, carried out preventively or when signs of near-
balance/underbalance are observed, if positive (well flowing), are generally considered 
as a positive kick indicator. However, there have been occasions when low volume and 
gradual influx were not detected in low permeability formations (possibly mistaken for 
the U-tubing effect if the flow check time is short, i.e. suspended before 30 minutes), and 
shut-in pressures were not read upon preventive closure of the BOP, which is caused by 
low accuracy of the pressure gauges at a few hundred psi over a scale of 5,000 or 10,000 
psi (Ahmed, Hegab, & Sabry, 2016). In other instances, apparent positive flow-checks 
were related to ballooning formations, where fluid was stored in natural fractures or a 
slight deformation of the borehole and was returned by rock elasticity when the mud 
pumps were turned off. 
It should be noted that an increase in background gas over time may indicate an 
increase in pore pressure or the penetration of a reservoir, whereas connection gas 
(detected once bottoms up is circulated after a Drill Pipe connection) and pump-off gas 
readings (when the pumps are off and the ECD is equal to the static MW, allowing influx 
to enter the borehole in case the well is in a nearbalance condition) indicate underbalance 
or near-balance conditions (Ahmed et al., 2016) 
The indicators can be divided between instantaneous and lagged, according to the 
time required for identification. Instantaneous drilling parameters such as ROP, pump 
pressure, flow returns, and pit levels provide an immediate indication of the presence of 
a kick, whereas lagged indicators such as gas readings may indicate underbalance 
conditions. The mud circulated out of the bit carrying formation gas that it comes into 
contact with is only analysed once it arrives at surface, and lag time in deep wells may 
well be over 60 minutes. Increases in gas readings are an important tool for early kick 
detection as they indicate near-balance conditions hours before a kick occurs, at a point 
in time when a flow check would be negative and shut-in pressures zero, but drilling 
another stand with the same mud weight could lead to a kick. Logging While Drilling 
(LWD) readings are also considered to be lagged indicator since the sensor offset is 
typically around 15m from the bit and the data often needs quality checking and/or 
processing before it can be considered meaningful and reliable. 
Ahmed, Hegab, & Sabry (2016) recommend a number of mitigation measures 
related to equipment and procedures that may help with early kick detection before it 
escalates to a more serious kick or a blowout. When a kick is suspected, a flow check 
should be made for no less than 30 min before it is judged negative, and through the trip 
tank for better accuracy and to enable the mud logging service to record it. Even in the 
case of a negative flow check, it is worth investing the time required for bottom-up 
circulation, to probe the gas levels of the mud that was in contact with the last formation 
drilled and assess the hydrostatic balance. Furthermore, additional pressure gauges with 
a smaller scale (hence higher accuracy at low pressures) should be installed at the choke 
manifold, to prevent minor influxes from going undetected upon shutting the well in, such 
as during a condition of slight underbalance. 
2.3.3 Blowout Preventer Systems 
The last blowout safety barrier and the main safety equipment used in oil well 
drilling operations is the Blowout Preventer (BOP), and the specifications of this system’s 
working conditions on are based on: (i) the pore pressure gradient and (ii) the estimate of 
the density of a potential influx in the well (oil and/or gas). 
The main BOP safety function is to close-in and control the unintended influx of 
reservoir energy that can occur during well operations. The subsea BOP system is made 
up of three main subsystems to achieve this function (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 
2011) (Strand & Lundteigen, 2015): 
 The control system that distributes hydraulic power fluid from the hydraulic 
power unit and accumulator banks used for activation of the BOP closure 
elements. Modern control systems are based on two principles; electro-hydraulic 
(‘multiplex’) or pilot hydraulic (‘all hydraulic’). 
 The Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) that provides the ability to connect and 
disconnect the drilling riser (connected to the rig) from the BOP stack (connected 
to the subsea wellhead). For example, in bad weather conditions or in a ‘drive-
off’/ ‘drift-off’ situation with a dynamically positioned (DP) rig. 
 The BOP stack that connects to the wellhead and is made up of a ‘stack’ of BOP 
elements for well shut-in, acting within ca. 30-60 seconds when activated in 
different well control situations (i.e. different tubular sizes and well pressures). 
 The BOP operation mode depends on how the elements are triggered. For 
example, using a Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) the intervention is direct; 
however, that is a contingency as it requires time to deploy the ROV. The standard 
procedure entitles the driller to use the BOP control panel and/or the emergency 
shut-down system (ESD)  (Strand & Lundteigen, 2015). 
The BOP system’s layout and specifications are rig and well-specific; however, 
industry standards provide clear guidelines on their design (BSEE, 2014) and testing 
requirements (API, 2012). 
A Technical review detailed by Strand & Lundteigen (2015), identified seven 
distinct BOP well isolation (close-in) scenarios that vary in accordance with the drilling 
stage, drilling technique and the arrangement of: drill string position and spacing, 
pressure, well geometry, and kick tolerance/fracture gradient. Kick tolerance is the 
maximum amount of influx of certain density that would cause the weakest formation 
interval to fracture. The characteristics of the BOP that impact its reliability aspects, such 
as being a system activated under demand and testable overtime, are investigated by 
several studies (Cai, Liu, Liu, Tian, Dong, et al., 2012; Cai, Liu, Liu, Tian, Zhang, et al., 
2012; Strand & Lundteigen, 2015) and will not be detailed in this paper. The important 
characteristic of the BOP system that should be highlighted for the purposes of this paper 
is that such system change from rig to rig and are also a function of the well design.  
3 METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The methodology adopted to develop the blowout accident precursor risk model 
is a further development of the three-level modeling guideline suggested by Perez & Tan 
(2017), which is based on achieving the following objectives:   
 Objective 01: Reflect specific risks in the function of the well drilling phase and 
well operations. 
 Objective 02: Model specific design and operational conditions of safety barrier 
systems (top side and well) that affect the failure probability of these systems. 
 Objective 03: Identify risk influencing factors (RIF) that affect the performance 
of the safety barrier elements. 
The following work plan is proposed for designing the blowout risk model in 
accordance with the previously mentioned objectives, assuring the integration of: basic 
causes, safety barriers, Risk Influencing Factors (RIF) and Operational Performance 
Indicators (OPI). The specific guidelines related to each step of the work plan are 
provided later, and the model designed in accordance with the guidelines is presented in 
the following section (Section 4, Results). 
 Figure 2: Workflow for developing the blowout model. 
 
3.1 Prepare Blowout Accidental Sequence and Identify its Basic Events: 
The blowout accidental sequence must reflect a specific drilling phase of a project. 
Examples of specific drilling phases exposed to blowout hazards are: a blowout while 
drilling into the reservoir, a blowout while tripping out of the hole and a blowout while 
drilling into over pressure zones or shallow hazard areas.  
The mapping of the simplified accidental sequence and identification of the basic 
events of the model were based on a review of drilling and blowout concepts, which was 
summarized in Section 2, and considered contribution from the following research 
papers: (Xue, Fan, Rausand, & Zhang, 2013) who presented a safety barrier-based 
accident model for offshore drilling blowouts, and; (Nima, Khan, & Amyotte, 2013) who 
proposed a Bayesian approach for blowout risk modelling. 
The basic events were identified depending on the simplified accident sequence 
model, which considers the kick as the top event, as the kick is the major blowout accident 
precursor.  
3.2 Classification of the basic events: 
The classification of safety barriers is an important step since it allows the 
characteristics of each element of the model to be understood and addressed. This 
classification was performed in accordance with Sklet (2006). The risk influencing factors 
(RIF) related to hardware (Technical Factors – TF) and human and organizational factors 
(HOF), and their related operational performance indicators (OPI), were identified in line 
with drilling safety indicator areas of influence suggested by Skogdalen, Utne, & Vinnem 
(2011), which was based on experience from the Macondo blowout. 
Accordingly, the basic events (En) were classified in accordance with the three 
following concepts: barrier element, barrier system and risk influencing factors (RIF) 
related to geological and geophysical (G&G) conditions of the reservoir. The purpose of 
this classification is to separate the basic elements of the model into three distinct levels, 
to provide specific modelling considerations that will allow the blowout model to be 
customized for specific drilling projects (Step 4). 
The general definition of safety barriers in the context of this paper is in 
accordance with Sklet (2006). This author defines safety barriers as physical and/or non-
physical measures planned to prevent, control or mitigate undesired events or accidents. 
The measures may range from a single technical unit or human actions, to a complex 
socio-technical system. In line with ISO 13702 (2015), prevention means reducing the 
likelihood of a hazardous event, control means limiting the extent and/or duration of a 
hazardous event to prevent escalation, while mitigation means reducing the effects of a 
hazardous event. For the purposes of this paper, all safety barriers are considered 
preventive, considering that the focus is on protecting the crew from a possible blowout 
and not on the mitigation of further potential consequences. 
Additional definitions from Sklet (2006) were also adopted for this paper: barrier 
functions and barrier systems. Barrier functions describe the purpose of safety barriers or 
what the safety barriers should do to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or 
accidents. A barrier system is a system that has been designed and implemented to 
perform one or more barrier functions. A barrier system describes how a barrier function 
is realized or executed. If the barrier system is functioning, the barrier function is 
performed. A barrier element is a component or a subsystem of a barrier system that by 
itself is not sufficient to perform a barrier function, and risk influencing factor (RIF) 
stands for any factor, including human and organizational factors (HOF), capable of 
affecting the performance of the barrier function by affecting an element or a system. 
Table 3 presents the classification guidelines derived from the definitions of Sklet 
(2006) that are used for categorizing the basic elements of the proposed model. 
Table 3: Classification of the basic elements of the model. 
Modeling 
Level 
Basic Element Guide for classification 
1 
Safety barrier 
element 
Single piece of hardware or software for which failure data is 
usually available in failure databases. 
Hardware or software that was not considered a complex socio-
technical system, for instance: zero or low degree of 
dependability with other elements and systems, little or no 
variation in terms of technology and arrangement. 
2 
Safety barrier 
system 
Systems composed of a combination of barrier elements that 
may significantly change in accordance with the well or rig 
type, in terms of: the degree of dependability, the system’s 
arrangement (redundancy), operational/ management practices 
and the technology of the specific barrier elements that 
comprises the system. 
3 
Risk Influencing 
factors 
Risk influencing factors are external factors capable of 
affecting the blowout risk and can be divided into: geological 
and geophysical factors (G&G), human and organizational 
factors (HOF) or technical factors (TF). 
 
Additionally, barrier elements and systems are classified according to their 
typology: hardware, socio-technical and human/operational barrier (Figure 3). This is a 
simplified classification also based on the work developed by Sklet (2006), who reviewed 
the basic concepts of safety barriers including their different classification processes. The 
purpose of classifying the barriers into these typologies is to facilitate identification of 
risk influencing factors (RIF), since different types of RIF will affect the performance of 
safety barriers depending on their typology. 
 Figure 3: Proposed simplified safety barrier classification process. 
 
3.3 Blowout Risk Model Design: 
The blowout accident precursor risk model was designed by combining the 
following techniques:  fault trees (to model the failure probability of sub-systems), event 
trees (to model the kick escalation into the blowout) and directed acyclic graphs (DAG) 
to account for the effect of the RIF on the performance of the safety barriers. 
The top event of the bow-tie, which connects the fault tree to the event tree is the 
kick, as this is the blowout major accident precursor.  Fault tree analysis (FTA) was 
adopted to model the logical relationship between the sub-systems that, in case of failure 
or given specific conditions, will lead to a kick. The escalation from the kick to the 
blowout wasmodeled using event tree analysis (ETA), modeling both the success 
(Y=Success) and failure (N=Failure) of the following systems responses: kick detection 
and activation of the blowout preventer. 
It should be noted that the blowout risk is expected to change over time due to 
characteristics that are inherent to drilling activities. The regular operational changes over 
time (dynamic), as well as the blowout model characteristics limit the adoption of the 
bow-tie methodology as a unique modeling technique. Additional limitations are due to 
the lack of statistical data to quantify external risk influencing factors (RIF), human and 
organizational factors (HOF), and conditional dependencies (mostly between RIF), as 
demonstrated by Nima, Khan, & Paltrinieri (2014). Due to this inherent limitation, the 
bow-tie accident precursor model was complemented with directed acyclic graphs 
(DAG), with the purpose of mapping the cause and effect relationships between barrier 
elements and systems by using the groups of risk influencing factors (RIF) identified in 
this paper. 
The failure of a barrier element or barrier system affected by a group of risk 
influencing factors (RIF) is represented in accordance with Figure 4 (Perez & Tan 
(2017)). 
 
Figure 4: Bayesian network representation of failure of barrier element or system 
affected by a group of RIFs. 
Equation 2 is a Bayesian inference obtained from the traditional Bayes theorem, with the 
purpose of calculating the posterior failure probability of a barrier element or system 
given the specific conditions of ‘n’ RIF:  
 
P(Ē |C1, C2, … , Cn) = P(Ē) ×  ∏
P(Ci |Ē)
P(Ci)
n
i=1
 
(2) 
Bayesian inference derives the posterior probability as a consequence of 
two antecedents, a prior probability and a probability distribution which, in this case, is 
derived from observable data:  
 P(Ē | C1, C2, … , Cn)  is the posterior probability (Failure if TRUE and Operational 
if FALSE) of the barrier element or system given the influence of a specific group 
of risk factors (C1, C2, … , Cn); 
 P(Ē) is the prior failure probability of a barrier element or system; 
 P(Ci) is a probability distribution that represents the different possible observable 
conditions (states) of a risk influencing factor (Cn); and 
 P(Ci | Ē) is the probability of a specific RIF given Failure (TRUE) or functionality 
(FALSE) of the barrier element, which can be expressed by the conditional 
probability table (CPT). 
3.4 Customization of the Model to specific project conditions: 
The customization of the model consists of implementing the work plan required 
for meeting the objectives of Level 2 and 3, which are: 
 Calculating the prior failure probability of each safety critical barrier system by 
modelling the systems into its major basic elements, accounting for 
instrumentation technology, and for the elements' arrangement in the system and 
operational aspects of the system; 
 Mapping potential interdependency between the safety barrier's systems; 
 Identifying and mapping the group of RIF (Technical and HOF) affecting the 
performance of each safety barrier element; 
 Correlating the RIF to the Company’s Safety Management System (SMS) to allow 
verification of the adequacy of the RIF based on the most up-to-date information 
from: audit programs, inspections and KPI. 
Section 4.2 provides a theoretical application that demonstrates the process of 
customizing the blowout risk model (Level 1) for the specific conditions of a drilling 
project (Level 2 and 3). 
3.5 Assumptions 
The assumptions made when developing the blowout risk model presented by this 
paper are: 
 The model considers the scenario of a blowout while drilling into the reservoir in 
an exploration well; 
 The rig is assumed to be a deep-water drilling rig, consequently with a sub-sea 
blowout preventer (BOP) and marine riser; 
 The focus of the model is to prevent a blowout accident precursor event (kick/ 
losses), and on the modelling of the causal basic events in primary and secondary 
well barriers that could cause a breakdown in the escalation towards a well control 
situation. Failure during well control operations after closing the BOP and the 
escalation of the blowout to different scenarios are not part of this work; 
 Since the focus is to detail the basic cause of the kick/losses, the model does not 
detail the different potential consequences of the blowout. However, for risk 
calculation, it can be assumed the worst-case scenario for Individual Risk Per 
Annum (IRPA), which is a constant exposure of the drilling crew and a fatality 
rate of 100% in the case of a blowout. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Blowout Risk Model (Level 1) 
The basic events of the model were identified from the blowout escalation factors, 
which are defined as the factors that can contribute to the failure of the blowout primary 
and secondary barriers, are presented by the yellow boxes in Figure 5. These basic events, 
presented later in Table 4, were classified into: failures of barrier elements, failures of 
barrier systems or specific G&G risk factors that may directly contribute to the occurrence 
of the blowout. 
 
 
Figure 5: Accident precursor qualitative bow-tie diagram for a blowout event sequence. 
 
From Figure 5 it can be seen that the loss of the primary well control barrier 
(hydrostatic pressure imposed by the mud column pumped into the well), occurs when 
such pressure is exceeded by the reservoir pressure(𝑝ℎ <  𝑝𝑟). This can be caused by 
integrity failures, unexpected geological and geophysical (G&G) conditions, or failure in 
managing the mud pumped into the well (or a combination of these events). If the primary 
well control barrier fails, a kick will occur.  
To avoid the escalation to a blowout, the blowout preventer (secondary well 
control barrier) must be activated to shut-in the well and, to activate the BOP, the kick 
must be identified in time (before hydrocarbons reach the BOP). 
Table 4 presents a breakdown of the escalation factors displayed in the bow-tie 
diagram into the basic elements of the blowout risk model, as well as their classification 
in accordance with the guidelines presented in Table 3 and Figure 3. 
Table 4: Identification and classification of blowout basic events. 
 
(*) Well integrity system includes all hardware elements that vary in different phases of the drilling program 
and may include the combination of one or more of the following barriers:  cement, casing, check-valves 
and plugs. 
The classification of the blowout basic events shows that the blowout risk model 
combines all types of safety barriers as well as G&G risk factors, therefore it may be 
classified as a complex socio-technical system. As shown by Reason (1990), the 
operational reliability of complex socio-technical systems is dependent upon human 
operators as well as on the organization (procedures and management practices).  
Skogdalen, Utne, & Vinnem (2011) suggested several operational indicators at 
the organizational and operational level related to deep-water drilling. These indicators 
are associated with typical safety management practices adopted in deep-water drilling 
and may be used for identification of risk influencing factors - divided into operational 
aspects and technical conditions - that affect the system during the operational phase. As 
a result, it is possible to correlate these RIF with the typology of the safety barriers of the 
socio-technical system, which in this case is the blowout risk model.  
Table 5 presents the correlation between risk influencing factors (RIF) and 
operational performance indicators (OPI) with the different types of safety barriers as a 
function of their typology. 
Table 5: Identification of Risk Influencing Factors (RIF) and typical Operational 
Performance Indicators (OPI) according to safety barrier typology. 
RIFn 
Risk Influencing 
Factors 
Examples of OPI specific for 
Drilling Blowout 
Typology 
RIF1 Competence and 
training; 
- Kick drills performance indicator; 
- Well control competency 
indicators; 
Software 
(HOF) 
Socio-
Techno 
Systems 
RIF2 Communication; - Adequacy of record of reports 
related to well planning, drilling 
daily reports and operational 
meetings; 
RIF3 Procedures (work 
practices); 
- Adequacy of well control 
procedure to industry standards and 
rig/ well characteristics; 
RIF4 Work schedule 
aspects; 
- Work schedule in accordance to 
industry standards; 
RIF5 Management and 
documentation; 
- Reliability (Q/A) and availability 
of well plan and drilling program; 
- Adequacy of well plan and 
drilling program Management of 
Change (MoC); 
RIF6 Installation and 
maintenance 
procedures; 
- Adequacy of maintenance and 
equipment installation work orders 
and procedures to equipment/ 
systems’ specifications; 
Hardware 
(TF) 
RIF7 Tests and 
inspections; 
- Tests/ inspections executed as 
planned; 
- Results of tests/ inspections; 
RIF8 Preventive 
maintenance; 
- Preventive maintenance executed 
as planned; 
- Results of corrective actions; 
 
The barriers must be available and adequate for the design and operational 
conditions to guarantee the performance of the safety function. The effectiveness of the 
barriers is assessed by verifying their reliability and the adequacy of the risk influencing 
factors (RIF) that affect each barrier. The degree of adequacy for the RIF can be assessed 
based on industry standards and industry good practices that are generally measured by 
one or more of the OPI provided as examples in Table 2 (for G&G risk factors) and Table 
5 (for human, organizational HOF and technical factors TF). 
The blowout model resulting from this process is presented in Figure 6 and 
combines the following modeling techniques: fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree 
analysis (ETA) and directed acyclic graph (DAG), which is the basis for Bayesian 
Network (BN) modeling. The model is composed of different symbols, as it combines 
not only different techniques but also different basic events from: barrier elements, barrier 
systems and risk influencing factors (HOF and G&G). 
 Figure 6: Blowout accident precursor risk model 
From this mapping, it could be shown that the kick of a well will occur when 
geophysical and geophysical (G&G) conditions (hydrocarbon, pressure, permeability and 
porosity) are present (E1), combined with the failure of the primary barrier. The primary 
barrier fails when the hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore is lower than the formation 
pressure (ph – pp < 0) or, in other words, when the mud weight pressure’s gradient 
becomes lower than the formation pore pressure’s gradient.  
An alternative situation that may lead to the kick is when hydrocarbons migrate 
to the surface through the annular space due to failure of the well integrity system (E2), 
which barrier elements and configuration strongly depend on during well design, the 
drilling phase, and well operations. For instance, pressure communication from the 
reservoir through a failed or channelled cement barrier, a failed casing pipe, connection, 
or liner hanger. Failure of the well integrity system constitutes the root cause of the two 
hypotheses of hydrocarbon flow paths generated by the Macondo blowout investigation 
(Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). 
The hydrostatic pressure in the wellbore is lower than the formation pressure 
(𝑝ℎ – 𝑝𝑟 < 0) when one of the following conditions are met: insufficient mud weight or 
insufficient mud level in the wellbore. Insufficient mud weight may result from several 
factors, including failure in preparing or designing the mud, or due to external factors 
related to G&G conditions that directly affect its weight. Insufficient mud level occurs 
when there are mud losses combined with failure to fill the well with mud, due to failure 
in the rig mud circulation system or unavailability of sufficient mud in the active and 
reserve tanks. The reliability of the mud circulation system may significantly change in 
accordance with: the number of mud pumps available and required to deliver mud to the 
wellbore and mud system components and controls. Failure of the power generation and 
distribution system may also lead to complete failure of the mud circulation system. 
When a kick occurs, regardless of its causes, there is only one last barrier system 
that can stop it escalating to a blowout: the blowout preventers (BOP). The activation of 
the BOP depends of the success of the kick detection system and the BOP hardware 
system itself. The kick detection system is strongly dependent upon human and 
organizational factors (HOF) as it may fail either due to operator’s error in interpreting 
pressure readings and well conditions data (E14), or due to hardware not providing proper 
data to the operator (E15), as presented in the simplified Technical Factors (TF) for the 
kick detection system. The BOP will fail when its activation control system fails (E16) or, 
when the BOP stack components fail (E17), is responsible for shutting-in the well and 
isolating the rig from the reservoir’s energy. 
In the blowout model the RIF were divided into the following groups: 
 Geological and geophysical (G&G) risk factors: presence of hydrocarbons, 
porosity, permeability, high pressure/ high temperature (HP/HT) and abnormal 
pressure (Table 2); 
 Human and organizational factors (HOF): RIF1 (competence and training), RIF2 
(communication), RIF3 (procedures), RIF4 (schedule aspects related to human 
factors) and RIF5 (management and documentation) – (Table 5); 
 Technical factors (TF): RIF6 (installation and maintenance procedures), RIF7 
(tests/ inspections), RIF8 (preventive maintenance) – (Table 5). 
Socio-technical systems are systems impacted by both technical and human and 
organizational factors – (Table 5). 
4.2 Blowout Risk Model Customization (Level 2 & 3) 
The first step for reflecting specific conditions of the drilling project and rig in the 
blowout risk model (Figure 6) is to detail the specific failure probability of the Level 1 
barrier systems. This is done by modeling the barrier system into the specific barrier 
elements. The second step consists of identifying and correlating the RIF that may affect 
the performance of the barrier system’s elements. 
The BOP control system (E16), a safety critical part of the BOP system, was 
chosen as an example of a safety barrier system. For the sake of simplicity, the BOP 
control system was simplified into the following major critical elements (Strand & 
Lundteigen, 2015): 
 Main control system composed of two redundant BOP control panels; 
 Independent dual control POD for operation; 
 Hydraulic power unit and distribution system; and 
 Accumulators that provide ‘fast closure’ (emergency mode) of the BOP 
components in the case of a loss of power fluid connection to the surface. 
Table 6 presents the information required to break down a barrier system into its 
elements and meets the requirements related to the Level 2 objective. 
Table 6: Level 2 Modeling spreadsheet example. 
 
The next step consists of reflecting specific conditions of RIF in accordance with 
the methodology presented in the previous section. Table 7 demonstrates a correlation 
between a customized barrier system and an applicable group of RIF. The group of RIF 
in the example was defined in accordance with the correlations presented in Table 5: 
Identification of Risk Influencing Factors (RIF) and typical Operational Performance 
Indicators (OPI) according to safety barrier typology. The status column presents 
examples of observable information that can indicate the general adequacy (conditions) 
of RIF affecting each barrier element. 
Table 7: Level 3: Risk Influencing Factors Spreadsheet example. 
 
The information presented in both Tables is mapped into a Bayesian Network 
(BN), which allows probability updating in accordance with the verifications provided in 
the “Status” column of Table 7. 
Figure 7 presents the BN constructed in accordance with the methodology 
presented in the previous section. The following assumptions were adopted for the sake 
of simplicity and demonstration: 
 Prior failure probability of barrier elements were considered 5%; and 
 A simplified conditional probability table (CPT) was provided in Figure 8. The 
only purpose of the CPT is to reflect the belief that failure probability will 
decrease when the OPI of each RIF is considered to be compliant and will increase 
when they do not comply with pre-defined conditions of operations and design 
specifications. 
 The results from test and inspections (Operational/ Failure) provide direct updates 
on the status of the barrier element and not on the RIF condition. 
Table 8: CPT explained for demonstration. 
Possible States of Barrier Element 
(E16.n) 
Barrier Element status 
Operating Failure 
Adequate or On-schedule 0.9 0.2 
Non-adequate or Delayed 0.1 0.8 
 
Figure 8 in the sequence presents the BN updated in accordance with the 
observations registered in Table 7.  
 
 Figure 7: Bayesian Network for consolidating Level 2 with Level 3 spreadsheets (Non-updated Probability). 
 Figure 8: Bayesian Network for consolidating Level 2 with Level 3 spreadsheets (Updated Probability). 
 
The performance of the BOP control system is affected by the conditions that 
were defined for the RIF affecting the barrier elements of the system, in accordance with 
the example provided in Table 7. The failure probability of the system raised from 1% to 
77%, a significant variation for a major sub-system of a safety critical system (BOP). 
5 CONCLUSION 
Offshore drilling is a complex and risky activity, the safety of which depends on 
the reliability of a complex socio-technical system, which is a combination of technical 
and non-technical systems. The modeling method demonstrated by this paper, based on 
the three-level modeling guideline from Perez & Tan (2017), has been shown to be 
efficient in integrating all the elements of this kind of singular socio-technical system: 
operational performance indicators (OPI), risk influencing factors (RIF), barrier elements 
and safety critical systems. 
The blowout model that was designed in accordance with the method reinforced 
that, in order to mitigate the risks of blowout in deep-water drilling, the following aspects 
must be closely monitored and controlled: G&G risks factors, and the adequacy of risk 
influencing factors (not only related to hardware maintainability elements but also related 
to human and organizational factors (HOF) and processes).  
The demonstration of the customization process of the barrier system (E16 BOP 
Control System) for meeting Level 2 and Level 3 requirements provided practical tools 
(Table 6 and Table 7) that can be replicated for customizing the entire model to reflect 
the specific conditions of any drilling project. Also, it illustrated how the specific 
conditions of the barrier elements that compose a system can affect the system’s 
reliability, under the assumption that external mechanisms affect its performance.  
Consequently, it is shown that designing and implementing a risk-based plan 
focused on monitoring and maintaining the ideal performance of the elements of this 
model will drive down the risk of blowouts and contribute to the improvement of 
operational risk-based decision-making processes.  
6 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND FUTURE WORK 
The limitations of this work that should be highlighted are: 
 The limited comprehensiveness of the model, as it was only designed to cover the 
major elements of Level 1. The customization to Level 2 and 3 was applied only 
to an example for a BOP Control System; and 
  The lack of or limited access to statistical data for incorporating blowout risk 
influencing factors (RIF) into the quantitative risk analysis QRA, including the 
ones related to geological and geophysical (G&G) aspects and human and 
organizational factors (HOF) relevant to drilling.  
From the previously mentioned limitations, the following future research has been 
suggested: 
 Test the suitability of different methods for incorporating RIF into QRA, with a 
focus on the characteristics of blowout drilling. Some relevant methods include: 
BORA Release (Aven, Skelet, & Vinnem, 2006; Skelet, Aven, & Vinnem, 2006), 
Risk OMT program (Vinnem, Bye, Gran, Kongsvik, & Nyheim, 2012) and APPM 
(Perez & Tan, 2018); 
 Customize the blowout risk model proposed by this paper to reflect the conditions 
of a full scale project, by implementing the customization guidelines for safety 
critical systems, risk influencing factors (RIF) and operational performance 
indicators (OPI). 
7 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank Witt O’Brien’s Brasil and Pemex Exploration and 
Production for partially sponsoring this work, and most of all: Adriano Ranieri, Greg 
Fenton, Flavio Andrade, Dr. Faustino Fuentes Nucamendi and Eduardo Zavala Nacer. 
Thanks also to Mr. Thiago Molina for providing his expertise on latest generation 
Deepwater MODU's, which enabled to add current and practical aspects to the academic 
research on kick detection and well control issues. 
 
Abbreviations 
BHA Bottom hole assembly 
BOP Blowout Preventer 
BORA Barrier and operational risk analysis 
DAG Directed acyclic graph 
DP Dynamically positioned 
ECD Equivalent Circulating Density 
G&G Geological and Geophysical 
HC Hydrocarbon 
HOF Human and organizational factors 
HP/HT High Pressure/High Temperature 
HSE Health, Safety and Environment 
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
IRPA Individual Risk Per Annum 
ISM International Safety Management Code 
ISO International Standard Organization 
LMRP Lower Marine Riser Package 
LWD Logging While Drilling 
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
OPI Operational performance indicators 
OPI Operational performance indicators 
RIF Risk influencing factors 
ROP Rate of penetration 
ROV Remote operated vehicle 
RPM Rotation per minute 
SINTEF 
Stiftelsen for industriell og teknisk forskning or “ The Foundation for 
Scientific and Industrial Research" 
TF Technical Factors 
WOB Weight on bit 
WOC Weight on cement 
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